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Article 4

BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE'S
APHORISMS
AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF
LATITUDINARIANISM
Melvyn New

A proverb, one might say, is a ruin which stands on
the site of an old story and in which a moral twines
about a happening like ivy around a wall.
Walter Benjamin'

t

j^ahe origin of this brief encounter with Benjamin
I^Whichcote's Moral and Religious Aphorisms is the
accident of happening to be reading them at the same
time that I encountered a review in the Times Literary
Supplement of William Spellman's splendid study. The
Latitudinarians and the Church of England. The argument of
the reviewer, Brendan Bradshaw, follows a particularly
indicative train of thought; if Spellman is correct and the
' Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 108 ("The
Storyteller").
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latitudinarians did not in fact contribute to "radical Enlighten
ment scepticism," that is, to the Deists or to disbelief, then they
were only a group of "theologically conventional, socially and
politically conservative, and ultimately inconsequential dogooders," with no mark upon the history either of their own
or later times; hence, Bradshaw concludes, the "considerable
cost in scholarly energy and material resources that went into
the production" of Spellman's book cannot be justified.^ What
I hope to accomplish in this essay is twofold: first, to counter
the thrust of Bradshaw's argument by disclosing the political,
social, and theological bias that underpins it; and, second, to
suggest that our reading of latitudinarians, at least since the turn
of this century—and probably since the movement arose in the
early years of the Restoration—is in all likelihood the result of
that same bias.
Benjamin Which cote (1609-83), often considered one of the
-most liberal and influential of seventeenth-century Anglican
divines, offers an opportunity to do so in a manner I think
particularly significant for those of us who study theology
because of its influence on literature rather than for its own
sake.^ His aphorisms were not published until after his death;
the first edition appeared in 1703, edited by John Jeffery, an
archdeacon of Norwich and, significantly to my mind, also the
editor of Sir Thomas Browne's Christian Morals. A new edition
appeared in the middle of the century, edited by Samuel Salter,
^ TLS 0anuary 28. 1994), 25; Spellman's work was published by the University of
Geoi^ia Press in 1993.
' Of course, it might be suggested that no one, secular or religous, reads Whichcote
today; see Thomas McFarland, "Who was Benjamin Whichcote.' or, the Myth of
Aimotation" in Annotation and its Texts (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991), where Whichcote serves to illustrate our loss of a shared
culture: "Frank Kermode recently commented to me with surprise that one of the
world's most praised young scholars in literature of the English Renaissance asked,
in response to Kermode's remark about Benjamin Whichcote's role in Cromwell's
reign, 'who was Benjamin Whichcote?' I told the story in wonderment to another
younger scholar, also of international credentials, and the scholar asked, with
unperturbed directness, 'Who was Benjamin Whichcote?'" (175-76).
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a prebendary of Norwich; and as late as 1930, Dean Inge offered
them as a model of an Anglican Church that "because it was
national had to be comprehensive and yet insular, embracing all
except irreconcilables, but stiff against those who owned either
a foreign allegiance or no allegiance at all. It is part of the
ingrained politicism of English thought that Church history
should be written in this way.'"* Jeffery's introductory
comments in 1703 are even more to the point: "I am so far," he
announces, "from being an Enemy to Systems; that I confess, I
have an inveterate prejudice in Favour of them: Notwithstand
ing which, I must acknowledge; that the Doctrine of Morality
and Religion may be delivered, with special advantage, in the
form of Aphorisms."^
Tillotson's description of Whichcote, included by Jeffery in
the 1703 edition, is also noteworthy—in part because, like most
eulogies, it tells us so clearly how Archbishop Tillotson, the
greatest of latitudinarian preachers, wanted himself to be
remembered: "He was slow to declare his judgment; and modest
in delivering it. Never passionate, never peremptory: so far
from imposing upon others, that he was rather apt to yield:
And though he had a most profound and well-poised judgment;
yet was he, of all men I ever knew, the most patient to hear
others differ from him; and the most easy to be convinced,
when good reason was offered; and, which is seldom seen, more
apt to be favourable to another man's reason, than to his own"
(Salter, xxx-xxxi).^ Moreover, Tillotson concludes: "Studious
Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms, ed. W. R. Inge (London:
Elkin Mathews & Mariot, 1930), iii.
Quoted from Salter's edition (London, 1753), iii. Further quotations from
Salter's prefatory materials are cited in the text. The aphorisms are also quoted
from this edition, but only by their sequential munber; Salter's pages are
unnumbered. The aphorisms are divided into twelve centuries, but numbered
consecutively from 1 to 1,200.
' Spellman's discussion of Tillotson in The Latitudinarians is compulsory reading
for those who continue wrongly to believe he was symptomatic of a theology
tending toward deism or secular morality. See also Spellman, "Archbishop John
Tillotson and the Meaning of Moralism," Anglican and Episcopal History 56
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and inquisitive men commonly at such an age (at forty, or fifty
at the utmost;) have fixed and settled their judgments in most
points; and, as it were, made their last understanding-,...und after
that, they grow positive and impatient of contradiction;
thinking it a disparagement to them, to alter their judgment:
but our deceased friend was so wise, as to be willing to learn to
the last" (xxxi).
Behind Tillotson's portrait of Whichcote, I would maintain,
is the essential meaning of latitudinarianism, a meaning that is
restated in more than a few of Whichcote's 1,200 aphorisms.
It receives statement, for example, in #56: "Examine all
Principles of Education-, for since we are all Fallible; we should
suppose, we may be Mistaken. Quotidie depono aliquem
errorem." The same point is made again in #82: "The Most
that any of us know, is the least of that which is to be known";
and yet again in #130: "Our Fallibility and the Shortness of our
Knowledge should make us peaceable and gentle: because I may
be Mistaken, I must not be dogmatical and confident, peremp
tory and imperious. I will not break the certain Laws of
Charity, for a doubtful Doctrine or of uncertain Truth."
More to the point, perhaps, this attitude inheres in the very
nature of aphorism itself, a mode of writing that combines the
certainty and the fragmentedness of truth as it is available to the
postlapsarian mind after the sacrifice of Christ. On the one
hand, each statement, as with proverbial wisdom from scripture
to Karl Kraus and beyond, contains its own truth, the flash of
recognition or acknowledgment that we might associate with
the theological concept of real presence, the Word (words)
coming into (being restored to) harmony with the world.^
(l987):404-22; and Gerard Reedy, S. J., "Interpreting Tillotson," Harvard
Theological Review 86 (1993):81-103. The best bibliographical summary of the
present state of opinion on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglicanism may
be found in Chester Chapin's fine essay, "The Inseparability of Faith and Works
in Eighteenth-Century Anglican Thought: Reflections on a Recent Debate," Age
of Johnson 6 (1994), 283-319; on Tillotson, see, especially, 296-99.
' Borrowing from Walter Benjamin, we might label this presence, the "aura" of
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Typical of seventeenth-century writing, writing that will have
its final splendid moments in the heroic couplets of Pope and
the intricate balancings of Johnson's prose, Whichcote seeks
finality and closure in each sentence, using parallelism, balance,
and chiasmus among his favorite devices. On the other hand,
the 1,200 aphorisms are each independent of all the others, and
fortunately none of his editors has tried to organize them into
a coherent system, perhaps suspecting the complete failure of
any such enterprise.
This is not to say that there are 1,200 distinct ideas or
doctrines or positions represented by the 1,200 sentences.
Whichcote often repeats himself, rephrasing the same idea on
numerous occasions. But what is noteworthy, is that in no
instance that I could find, does he pursue one idea through a
series of aphorisms or establish any logical linkage from entry
to entry, from century to century. This omission seems to me
significant, a deliberate attempt to avoid that particular pursuit
of truth that emerges as system-making and logical (scientific)
development: that is, our commonplace notion (opinion) of the
path to truth that we have come to associate with truth itself,
at least since Bacon, Descartes, and the Royal Society. It is, in
fact, the very notion behind Bradshaw's review: the lack of a
forward-looking system among the latitudinarians, especially one
that could evolve into the deistic system, which in turn would
become the forerunner of modern liberal thinking—this lack is
a major default or lapse in terms of the intellectual or social or
theological significance of the latitude-men.
Surely, however, such deliberate fragmentation speaks to its
ow;n justification, as in this comment, #230: "Whatever is
contrary to Peace and Right and good Order, under God's
Government of the World; is to the Dishonour of God"; or
#349: "Enthusiasm is the Confounder, both of Reason and
Religion: therefore nothing is more necessary to the Interest of
Religion, than the prevention of Enthusiasm"-, and, once again.
"chaste compaaness" (91).
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aphorism #500: "The longest Sword, the strongest Lungs, the
most Voices, are false measures of Truth." What is of interest
in these assertions is their contextuality, the fact that their full
impact and significance is derived not within their closed fixity
but from their appeal to prior knowledge.^ These are opinions,
in other words, born not of dogmatism but of empiricism, the
experience of many years of bloody civil war prior to their
coming into being as felt truths. Stated as religious truths they
entail the doctrine of the fall and, insofar as false truths
recognize the existence of Truth itself, the doctrine of
redemption through Christ; or, as in the chiasmus of #407:
"Christ, who was Innocent, was dealt withal, as if he were
Faulty; that we, who are Faulty, might be dealt withal, as if we
were Innocent."
That Whichcote does not abandon the notion of the fall of
man is suggested in many of his aphorisms, as, for example,
#47: "The Superaddition to the Principles of God's Creation is,
the Declaration of God by Christ; directing us, how to come to
Reconciliation, through the Mediation of him; and upon Terms
of Repentance." The terseness here is truly splendid; the full
reach of Whichcote's theology inheres in three carefully spaced
words: "Reconciliation," "Mediation," and "Repentance." Taken
together, they tell the complete story of the first and second
Adam, the history of the world. Whichcote returns to man's
fallen condition in #184, "Man in this State is not, as he should
be; because of Non-use, and Mis-use, and Abuse of Himself: of
some one of which Every one is more or less Guilty"; and again
in #742, "We partake of the Death of Christ; by passing into the
' One could multiply such observations almost at wiU from among Whichcote's
1,200 entries, an ease which attests to the irenic context of latitudinarian thought;
two additional aphorisms, in particular, suggest how the immediate past weighed
heavily upon his mind—and hence his theology: "Nothing is worse done; than what
is ill done, for Religion. That must not be done, in the Defence of Religion; which
is contrary to Religion" (111) and "Nothing spoils human Nature more, than false
Zeal. The Good nature of an Heathen is more God-like, than the furious Zeal of
a Christian" (114).
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Spirit of Christ. The great work of Christ in Us lies, in
implanting his own Life...m the lapsed degenerate Souls of
Men." When one learns to accept such statements, without
heat, without, in Keats's phrase, nervous irritability, alongside
other contrary aphorisms wherein Whichcote celebrates the
rational and the reasonable in human nature (for example, #644:
"True Reason is so far from being an Enemy to any matter of
Faith-, that a man is disposed and qualified by Reason, for the
entertaining those matters of Faith that are proposed by God"),
one begins, I believe, to grasp the essential spirit, irenic and
anti-systematical, of latitudinarianism.
Although I have already belabored Bradshaw, the TLS
reviewer, let me point to one additional comment he makes,
quite obviously in disapproval, namely that Spellman posits the
towering intellectual presences behind latitude as, and I quote,
"the prince of Renaissance humanists, Desiderius Erasmus, now
being eagerly ckimed as an honorary Anglican, and the 'human
face' of medieval scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas" (25). I will
leave Aquinas for another time, and at present concentrate on
the evocation of Erasmus, which seems to me most telling, not
least because his own wisdom so often took the aphoristic
turn—his amazing collection of adages being only the most
obvious point of contact between him and Whichcote—and, I
might add. Sir Thomas Browne as well.' Stephen Toulmin in
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, provides the broad
context within which this linking of Erasmus and the Latitudemen becomes quite coherent: "In choosing as the goals of
Modernity an intellectual and practical agenda that set aside the
tolerant, skeptical attitude of the 16th-century humanists, and
' Chapin, 287, notes one important aspect of Erasmus's influence: "Solifidianism,
the belief that Christians are saved by a bare faith, was further undermined by the
influence of early sixteenth-century humanism. The extent of this influence on the
English reformers has been much debated, but it is a fact that at Cranmer's
instigation Erasmus's Paraphrases on the New Testament were translated into
English, and during the reign of Edward VI were ordered to be set like the English
Bible in some accessible place in church."
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focussed on the 17th-century pursuit of mathematical exactitude
and logical rigor, intellectual certainty and moral purity, Europe
set itself on a cultural and political road that has led both to its
most striking technical successes and to its deepest human
failures."'® Among those failures, of course, are the moral and
theological failures of the modern age, different from those of
previous eras not so much in kind as in expectation. The
notion that theology could produce a system of mundane
knowledge (ethical, social, political) that could reproduce Eden
is part of the legacy of Reform theology, of which Cromwell is
one certain manifestation. In opposition, the latitudinarians
barkened back to an earlier mode of theological thinking, one
that makes Toulmin's discussion of the "theological modesty"
of an Erasmus or a Montaigne reverberate with Whichcote's
aphoristic wisdom concerning the fallibilities of human
knowledge: "Montaigne," says Toulmin, "criticized claims to
theological certainty...as being presumptuous and dog
matic....Human modesty alone...should teach reflective
Christians how limited is their ability to reach unquestioned
Truth or unqualified Certainty over all matters of doctrine"
(25). Within the context of Renaissance humanism, skepticism
becomes not the forerunner of disbelief but of Christian faith,
and Erasmus's Praise of Folly and Montaigne's "Apology for
Raimond Sebonde" become the radical repositories of latitudinarian thought.
To acknowledge the important insights Toulmin's new
perspective affords, one need not agree with all his rather overly
generalized and reified notions of historical and intellectual
development. Hence, as one example, I find quite inadequate
his placing the Cambridge Platonists on the side of Descartes
because they abstracted morality, and saw "certainty" as the
only solution to religious conflict (76). Perhaps Henry More,
as a theorist, was too systematic, but the very hallmark of both
the Cambridge Platonists and the latitudinarians, to my mind,
(New York: The Free Press, 1990), x.
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is their constant translation of abstraction into the practicalities
of sermon discourse—that is, discourse addressed to the
congregations of sinners they addressed each week from their
pulpits. Chapin, notes, for example, the particular Cambridge
interest in the imitatio Christi tradition, which he then links,
quite rightly I believe, to Tillotson's pulpit emphasis on
morality, and considers it a movement toward rather than away
from orthodoxy. Edward Fowler, a very early defender of
latitudinarianism, addresses the charge of moral rather than
theological preaching very effectively: "these Preachers insist
upon...trae holiness, the divine life of vertue, the righteousness
which is of God by faith in Christ Jesus....\f\{ they upon the
account of their preaching up such a Righteousness alone as this,
call them in contempt Moral Preachers, they expose onely
themselves to contempt by so doing." And, he concludes: "Let
any one read our Saviours Sermon upon the Mount, and then
tell me whether he doth not think, that if He were now upon
the earth, these men would not call him a Moral preacher."^^
Between scholastic or theoretical or systematic divinity and
practical divinity there opened a very great divide in the hands
of the latitude preachers; and the complaint we make—follow
ing Leslie Stephen's similar complaints—concerning the
compromising and hence compromised nature of latitudinarian
theology, is really our own expectation that truth must (and
will) emei^e within systematized and logical arrangements. For
Toulmin, it is the Thirty Years' War that produced a society
dedicated to "clear and distinct ideas," to certainty and
conviction, and I am not quarreling with that broad outline of
events. But Toulmin, typical of the very systematizing he
criticizes, sweeps all before him into this new philosophy,
when, in fact, eighteenth-century Anglicanism, as it developed
out of seventeenth-century latitudinarianism, was almost
consistently opposed to Cartesian certainties—as is demonstrated
" Chapin, 298; and Fowler, Principles and Practices of certain Moderate Divines of
the Church of England (1670), 118, 120.
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by. so much of the literature, religious and secular, written
under this Anglican horizon. Whatever we might say about
France, where Toulmin's attentions are clearly centered, the
Anglican communion worked to ensure a world in which
Montaigne's pluralism was reawakened as a viable intellectual
option, one characterized by a "readiness to live with uncer
tainty, ambiguity, and differences of opinion"—quoting
Toulmin (55).'^ And this, I suggest, is the single most
important contribution of latitudinarianism to modern thought,
one we have tended to belittle or ignore, in large part because,
like Descartes, we have been—and many still are—committed to
the notion that truth and system are somehow synonomous.
Uncertainty and ambiguity have not—until quite re
cently—conformed to our concept of religious truth, which was
defined for us by various Cartesian reactions to latitude,
particularly Methodism (Whitefield's Calvinistic version, but
also, if to a lesser extent, Wesley's Arminian certitudes), the
Great Awakening, and the Oxford Movement." Nor were we
willing to accept as a statement of strong faith—and perhaps are
still reluctant to do so—notions that stress clarity, brevity,
minimal creed, and the like—the essence of both the aphorism
and latitudinarian thought. Yet it is precisely this linkage
between the two that creates for us a religious way of thinking
Toulmin repeats Montaigne's position from the viewpoint of Descartes: "he
could not share Montaigne's tolerance of ambiguity, unclarity, lack of certainty,
or the diversity of contrary human opinions" (62).
" One might suggest that any rehgion based upon incarnation cannot ultimately
be a religion of uncertainty or ambiguity; in this respect, the Jewish model of the
human-God relationship as one of dialogue rather than inspiration (enthusiasm),
meeting rather than incarnation, God as second rather than third person, is a
model toward which, after a century of religious warfare, the latitude-men may
have—however unconsciously—turned. One would not be too far afield from the
subject of this present essay if one consulted Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Ruber,
Gabriel Marcel and Philosophy," in Outside the Subject trans. Michael B. Smith
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 20-39, especially his wonderful
corrunent that "the history of philosophy [and of theology, I believe the
latitudinarians could add] is an ever-renewed struggle against the imprudence of the
spontaneous exercise of reason" (31).
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(rather than a religious system) that cannot be comprehended
by comparing isolated passages from now this sermon and now
another, or by reading Hooker from cover to cover, or by
citing the Thirty-Nine Articles as if they were dogmasd"*
Rather, latitudinarianism makes its intellectual and its religious
claims to consideration with one and the same incredibly quiet
voice, a voice determined by historical context, by doctrine, and
by a concomitant urge to modesty (humility) in thought, and
perfection in address: "Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not
thine heart be hasty to utter any thing before God: for God is
in heaven, and thou upon earth: therefore let thy words be
few." That, of course, is the aphoristic wisdom of Ecclesiastes
5:2, about which Robert South comments in his sermon
elucidating that particular text: "in General...to be able to
express our Minds briefly, and fully too, is absolutely the
greatest Perfection and Commendation that Speech is capable
of; such a mutual Communication of our Thoughts, being...the
next approach to Intuition', and the nearest Imitation of the
Converse of blessed Spirits made perfect, that our Condition in
this World can possibly raise us to. Certainly the greatest and
the wisest Conceptions that ever issued from the Mind of Man,
have been couched under, and delivered in a few, close, home,
and significant Words."^^
Fowler notes that the latitude-men heartily subscribed to them, "taking that
liberty in the interpretation of them, that is allowed by the Church her self.
Though it is most reasonable to presume, that she requires Subscription to them,
as to an Instrument of Peace onely"; and he quotes John Bramhall, the Archbishop
of Armagh {Schisme Guarded [London, 1658], 396) to the effect that the ThirtyNine Articles are not "necessary to he believed either necessitate medii, or necessitate
prsecepti, which is much less; hut onely hindeth her sons, for peace sake, not to oppose
them" (191). More than a century later (1769), Johnson would seem to endorse a
very similar statement in conversation with Boswell. On the entire subject, see the
useful essay by Richard Nash, "Benevolent Readers: Burnet's Exposition and
Eighteenth-Century Interpretation of -the Thirty-Nine Articles," ECS 25
(1992);353-60.
'5 "A Discourse against Long and Extempore Prayers" part 2, in Forty-Eight Sermons
and Discourses (London, 1715), 2:122-23.
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The difficult road the latitudinarians took concerning human
claims to the knowledge (intuition/ ingenuity) of truth is well
analyzed in the case of Whichcote by Robert A. Greene:
For Whichcote, therefore, the virtue of ingenuity lies
between the extremes of credulity and incredulity....
Contrasted at times with incredulity and at times with
credulity, ingenuity becomes associated with two different
and, on occasion, apparently conflicting sets of psycholog
ical attitudes and moral and intellectual virtues. Those
who refuse to give assent, the atheists and skeptics, are
full of conceit and self-regard....Those who assent too
easily or indiscriminately, also act irrationally and in a
manner unworthy of the nobility and dignity of man.
Ingenuity, on the contrary, joins together a proper
willingness to believe with a proper unwillingness to
believe anything not approved by reason....The true
novelity and ingenuity of man lies, somewhat paradoxi
cally, in the acknowledgement of his intellectual weakness
and sinfulness as well as in the recognition of his
obligation to live the life of reason.'^
One can begin to see, in Greene's exposition, the tendency of
latitudinarian thought to be best captured by the rhetorical
structure of chiasmus, where seemingly balanced, but actually
crossed alternatives (and, to the contrary, seemingly crossed, but
actually balanced ones) disappear within a central mystery or
paradox. That Greene's prose frequently slides toward such
chiastic expression is not an accident of style, but rather a
responsiveness to the very nature of latitudinarian thought.
Precisely because of this core of meaning simultaneously
masked and exposed by chiasmus, our understanding of
latitudinarianism can neither begin nor end with, arguments
" "Whichcote, Wilkins, 'Ingenuity,' and the Reasonableness of Christianity,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 240-41.
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over particular doctrinal issues, no matter how central we may
believe them to be within our own systems of faith.Not
doctrine, but attitude towards doctrine is the distinguishing
mark of the latitude-men, because every doctrine is a response
to a context, at the same time that it represents itself among
many possible doctrines.''
Whichcote captures this spirit of unclear clarity in aphorism
after aphorism, often by way of chiasmus, where the certainty
of each statement disappears within the silent complexity of
their crossing.'' One might begin, however, with a more
straightforward statement: "It is usual in Scripture to summ-up
all Religion, sometimes in a single Phrase; otherwhile in one
Word. The reason may perhaps be; because never any of these
is alone" (1034). And from this careful starting point, chiastic
wisdom develops: "Men have an itch; rather to make Religion,
than to use it; but we are to use our Religion; not to make it"
(36) and "Conscience, without Judgment, is Superstition-,
Judgment without Conscience, is Self-condemnation" (65),
which, taken together, encapsulate the latitudinarian (sup)position on individual revelation in the modern era. Or again.
" This is, to my mind, the central problem in Gregory E Scholtz's intemperate
"Anglicanism in the Age of Johnson: The Doarine of Conditional Salvation," ECS
22 (1988-89):182-207; Chapin's essay is a healthy corrective, as is, to a lesser extent,
Donald Greene's response, "How 'Degraded' Was Eighteenth-Century
Anglicanism.'" ECS 24 (1990):93-108.
See Fowler, xi-xii: "as God was not in the Whirlwind, but in the still Voice; so
Divine Truth is far more imlikely to be foimd among men of violent and
boisterous Passions, than among those that are soberly and sedately considerative.
Passion doth cloud and darken the understanding, it casts a thick mist before the
eye of the Soul, and makes it altogether unapt to discern a difference betwixt
Truth, and the error that is nearest to it; and to distinguish it from one of the
extreams which it lyeth between."
" See Max Nanny, "Chiasmus in Literature: Ornament or Function," Word &
Image 4 (1988), 51-59, especially his comment that there is a high frequency of
chiastic syntax in Book IE of Paradise Lost, perhaps a "formal reflexion of divine
symmetry or reciprocity between Father and Son" (52), since in this book the
debate between God the Father and God the Son takes place. I would suggest,
somewhat differently, that chiasmus reflects the mystery, the insolvability, of
incarnation, the "Cross" and the "crossing" having much to do with one another.
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"Where, the Doctrine is necessary and important, the Scripture
is clear and fulh but, where the Scripture is not clear and full;
the Doctrine is not necessary or important" (1188), latitude's
(sup)position on the Bible.^° And on yet another crucial issue:
"The Jewish Church was not so under the Law, as not to be
under Grace: and the Christian Church is not so under Grace,
as not to be under the Law" (1069), a wonderfully indefinite,
yet seemingly conclusive statement on the vexed question of
faith versus good works.^^ Finally, "Men are not so far to press
the Principles of God's Creation-, as to Neglect the Grace of
God: nor so far to depend upon the Grace of God; as to Neglect
See Fowler on the use of Scripture, 215-17, especially his persistent slide into
chiasmus: "And which is the safest course, think you, in reconciling seeminglycontrary places [in Scripture] to each other? To interpret a multitude of plain
Scriptures by a few difficult ones, or a few difficult ones by a multitude of plain
ones?...[I]s it not much the better way, to understand a few Scriptures, in their less
obvious sence, to reconcile them to the most obvious sence of a multitude of
others; than to understand a mirltitude of Scriptures in their least obvious sence,
to reconcile them to the most obvious of, in comparison with them, extremely
few?" Fowler's seemingly clear bias toward "obvious sence" masks the radical
hermeneutic mystery behind such a phrase, one further example of Levinas's
"imprudence of the spontaneous exercise of reason," exposing, in his words, the
"naivety at the heart of reflection" (31).
Chapin's entire essay is a most useful and persuasive primer on this question, but
one might also consult Fowler, who makes explicit on page after page that the
context of the latitudinarian's tilt toward "works" "was a response to the perceived
antinomianism of dissent; see esp. 128ff. Fowler also relies on aphorism and
chiasmus in making his point, as, for example, in an earlier discussion, 67: "we
know ["the Mosaical dispensation"] consisted of almost innumerable Injimctions, the
reason of which is not at all obvious. We may see our way before us, in obeying
Gospel-Precepts; they are enjoyned because good, whereas these were good onely
because enjoyned." It is important to recognize that the dispute over faith versus
good works, at least in its scriptural roots, was deemed by AngUcans to be largely
a question of audience: Paul was speaking to Jews (whose "Law" was considered
Pharisaical), James to pagans (who had no "Law"). This strategic resolution
persisted throughout the eighteenth century, often in chiastic form: "There can be
no true Religion without Morahty: Nor can there be sound Morahty without
Religion" (fohn Heylyn, Theological Lectures at Westminster-Abbey [1749], 1:42).
Literary scholars will recognize the chiasmus as anticipating (by one year) Sterne's
similar construttions in his "Abuses of Conscience" sermon (York, 1750), inserted
verbatim ten years later in volume 2 of Tristram Shandy.
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the Principles of God's Creation" (917), which represents
Whichcote's careful but again ultimately undecidable reasoning
on the vexed eighteenth-century question of a so-called Religion
of Nature (Reason) as it bears upon Christian revelation.^^
In each instance, the chiasmus speaks louder than the
doctrine, for truth emei^es only in the suspension of contrarities; "Keep Indifferency of Judgement, till the Verity of the
thing does appear; so long as there is any Uncertainty. Have no
Bias, but what is received from Truth" (173).^^ This is, to be
sure, the suspension, the epoche of the classical skeptic;^'^ and,
lest we forget the horizon from which these moments of
undecidability suspend themselves, three final aphorisms from
Whichcote's incomplete system of complete thoughts will have
to suffice:
#186: Man is sure of Nothing; he is not sure of Himself.
Man is a Wonder to himself; he can neither govern, nor
know himself.
#53: He that never changed any of his opinions, never
corrected any of his Mistakes: and He, who was never wise
enough, to find out any mistakes in Himself; will not be
Again Fowler parallels the sentiment as well as its chiastic structure: "though our
best Reason could never have proved to us divers Gospel-truths, had they not been
reveled; yet they being reveled, there is nothing, surely, in them, that rightly
understood, sounds so harshly, but that our Reason may admit of it, and close
with it" (94). The modifications of the second half, "surely," "rightly tmderstood,"
"sounds so harshly," suggest the enormous tensions hidden within (or, at the center
of) the apparent simplicity of the chiasmus.
Always rather odd, Whichcote's punctuation here might be usefully emended:
"Keep Indifferency of Judgement, till the Verity of the thing does appear; so long
as there is any Uncertainty, have no Bias, but what is received from Truth.
The latitudinarians could not come to rest with the skeptical position: "For if
I may not believe any thing against which I am not able to answer all Objections;
I must resolve to believe nothing at all, & to set up for a perfect Sceptick" (Fowler,
210). But skeptics also cannot come to rest, as Montaigne recognized in the
dilemma of the "liar's paradox," deconstruction's deconstruction; see my brief
discussion in Telling New Lies: Seven Essays in Fiction, Past and Present (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1992), 6-7.
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charitable enough, to excuse what he reckons mistakes in
Others.
#712: Men cannot differ, by true Religion; because it is
true Religion to agree. The Spirit of Religion is a
Reconciling Spirit.
The history of mankind, from Adam's fall to Oliver Crom
well's rise, can be located in these three sentences, and within
them the importance of latitudinarian theology to our own day
is both revealed and concealed: "The Most that any of us know,
is the least of that which is to be known" (82).

